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ABSTRACT
Threat intelligence sharing has become a growing concept,
whereby entities can exchange patterns of threats with each
other, in the form of indicators, to a community of trust
for threat analysis and incident response. However, shar-
ing threat-related information have posed various risks to
an organization that pertains to its security, privacy, and
competitiveness. Given the coinciding benefits and risks of
threat information sharing, some entities have adopted an
elusive behavior of “free-riding” so that they can acquire the
benefits of sharing without contributing much to the com-
munity. So far, understanding the effectiveness of sharing
has been viewed from the perspective of the amount of in-
formation exchanged as opposed to its quality. In this paper,
we introduce the notion of quality of indicators (QoI) for the
assessment of the level of contribution by participants in in-
formation sharing for threat intelligence. We exemplify this
notion through various metrics, including correctness, rel-
evance, utility, and uniqueness of indicators. In order to
realize the notion of QoI, we conducted an empirical study
and taken a benchmark approach to define quality metrics,
then we obtained a reference dataset and utilized tools from
the machine learning literature for quality assessment. We
compared these results against a model that only considers
the volume of information as a metric for contribution, and
unveiled various interesting observations, including the abil-
ity to spot low quality contributions that are synonym to
free riding in threat information sharing.
1. INTRODUCTION
Today, the Internet connects millions of users, networks,
and network collections worldwide, where the Internet’s se-
curity and stability are quite important to the global econ-
omy and well-being of the human race. However, challenged
by various forms of cyber-attacks, ensuring the security of
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the Internet and combatting the various attacks requires
proper reconnaissance that prelude countermeasure actions.
The information security and threat landscape has grown
significantly, making it difficult for a single defender to de-
fend against all of these attacks alone. As such information
sharing for threat intelligence, a paradigm in which threat
indicators are shared in a community of trust to facilitate
defenses, has been on the rise [1].
In threat intelligence sharing, participants exchange pat-
terns of threats with each others, in a form of threat indica-
tors or signals. Participants are defined over a community
of trust, and collaborate towards a common goal or mission;
to understand and respond to emerging threats [2]. For such
intelligence sharing to happen, standards for representation,
exchange, and consumption of indicators are proposed in the
literature [3, 4, 5]. Communities of trust are established,
and systems and initiatives for sharing are built. For such
initiatives to work, participants need to contribute infor-
mation in those systems to be consumed by other commu-
nity members. However, sharing threat-related information
have posed various risks to organization, which pertain to
security, privacy, and competitiveness. Given the coincid-
ing benefits and risks of threat information sharing, some
community members have adopted an elusive behavior of
“free-riding” [6] so that they can achieve utility of the shar-
ing paradigms without contributing much to the community.
So far, understanding the effectiveness of sharing has been
viewed from the point of view of whether participants con-
tribute or not using volume-based notions of contributions.
Thus, a community member who does not contribute a vol-
ume of data (indicators) is a free-riding community mem-
ber [7]. The state-of-the art on the problem did not include
other metrics beyond simple measures of volume-based con-
tribution, particularly metrics that capture and assess the
Quality of Indicators (QoI) as a mean of understanding con-
tribution in the information sharing paradigms.
1.1 Quality of Indicators
We believe that the nature of the information sharing as a
concept and its application to threat intelligence both make
quality a very relevant notion, and call for further inves-
tigation into the notion’s definition and quantification in
various settings. A well-defined measure of QoI could pro-
vide a better way of capturing contribution in general, and
distinguishing community members who contribute useful
data. Furthermore, threat intelligence systems present dis-
tinct challenges and opportunities to counter the problem of
free-riding and other abusive behaviors once quality is de-
fined. On the one hand, these systems generally lack the
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enforcement of a central authority, and therefore entities in
these systems share information at their own will in a (some-
what) peer-to-peer fashion. As a result, it is necessary to
envision a set of notions and mechanisms that characterize
contribution in general, and are capable of capturing free-
riding, while being implemented in a distributed manner and
used by each community member. An ideal measure of QoI
should be robust to distinguish between the various members
based on their contribution, rather than a predefined notion
of trust. With the possible speciality of community mem-
bers, and the varying usefulness of indicators shared based
on the context in which they are used, a major challenge is
to assign context-dependent quality markers for indicators.
1.2 The Simple Contribution Measures
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of free-riding
in information sharing for threat intelligence, while sparsely
mentioned in other work [2, 8], is not treated properly in
the literature. Thus, this work is the first of its type to be
dedicated to the problem by identifying QoI as a new metric
of contribution to capture free-riding in information sharing
for threat intelligence.
Given the aforementioned challenges, one simple measure
of contribution in information sharing systems weigh the vol-
ume of indicators contributed by various community mem-
bers. However, for many reasons, such measure is insuf-
ficient, as described earlier. Therefore, it is important to
understand the quality of shared information as a form of
participation. Without a high quality of shared information,
we cannot achieve actionable intelligence that is effective in
combating cyber threats. Unfortunately, this issue is not
well understood in the literature, and requires further ex-
ploration by identifying the meaning of quality, and basic
methods and tools for assessing them are lacking.
1.3 Features of Quality of Indicators
In [1], Mohaisen et al. explored the potential correlation
between QoI and privacy. However, privacy is not the only
factor that affects QoI. One feature of quality is the correct-
ness of an indicator; a meaningful annotation and label of
the indicator that is true and accurate. A second possible
feature of quality is the relevance of the indicator to the com-
munity members; because of the targeted nature of modern
cyberthreats, information that is shared has to be contex-
tual to the domain. A third plausible feature of quality of an
indicator is its utility ; informally, some indicators are more
indicative than others about cyber-attacks, and therefore it
is critical that participants in the threat intelligence com-
munity share information that capture prominent features
of cyber-threats. Finally, the uniqueness of an indicator is
another assessor of quality, which is defined as a measure of
(dis)similarity with previously seen indicators. This prop-
erty ensures that participants deliver indicators that are not
duplicates or redundant, and provide additional threat in-
formation to other community members.
Besides these features, indicators are often time-sensitive,
making temporal features very important when evaluating
QoI. A timely indicator such as a source of an attack could
be used to defend against an emerging attack, unlike a stale
indicator that could be (potentially) used for postmortem
analysis. As mentioned above, there is also potential cor-
relation between QoI and privacy. Privacy can affect QoI
(although perhaps negatively when privacy of indicator is
ensured). We elaborate on this quality metric in this work,
and show its quantification through data-driven analysis.
While each of the aforementioned measures can be used
as a separate feature of quality, we envision that a single
indicator could have multiple of those features. As such, we
also assess QoI with respect to these metrics in the form of
a weighted (continuous) score. Our method for evaluating
QoI is based on exploiting a fine-grained historical records
as benchmark for assessing the contributions of community
members. We illustrate the concept through a concrete eval-
uation of a real dataset from various security vendors of an-
tivirus scans and their results of labeling malware samples
as seen in the VirusTotal service (https://virustotal.com/).
1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are multifold. First,
we identify the need for QoI to capture contributions by com-
munity members in information sharing paradigm. QoI cap-
tures a wide spectrum of behaviors, from altruistic behavior,
where a community member contributes a lot of (high qual-
ity) indicators to free-riding, where a community member
contributes less, or contribute a lot of low quality indica-
tors. Second, we develop and formulate various metrics that
are robust to capture the notion of quality. Third, we ex-
perimentally demonstrate those measures and metrics, and
show their robustness, and how they differ in identifying con-
tributor’s behavior (particularly free-riding) from the simple
volume-based measure of contribution.
1.5 Organization
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2,
we provide an overview on cyber-threat intelligence and the
risks of information sharing. In Section 3, we provide an
overview of our quality of indicator(QoI) assessment method-
ology. In Section 4, we describe the processes involved in our
QoI-based assessment. In Section 5, we present the results
of our benchmark experiment, afterwards we discuss related
work in Section 6 and finally we conclude in Section 7.
2. OVERVIEW AND PRELIMINARIES
We first provide an overview of cyber-threat intelligence
systems, then introduce to unique problem with information
sharing in these systems which demand quality measures.
2.1 The Threat Landscape
The Internet today connects hundreds of millions of users
worldwide, and is operated by service providers who connect
businesses, education institutes, and government agencies,
collectively forming a global village. In the recent years, the
Internet has been challenged by various forms of cyber at-
tacks, ranging from endpoint malware attacks [9] to massive
network disruptions and instabilities [10].
At the endpoint side, malware is capable of penetrating a
perimeter’s security in many enterprise systems, exfiltrating
sensitive data from such systems, and causing great dam-
age to both private and public sector networks [11]. At the
larger scale, multiple endpoint infections by malware are
more powerful, and pose a greater risk, seen often in sys-
temized large-scale botnets [12]. Botnets, defined as collec-
tions of networks of infected hosts are the basic fabric for the
operation of many cybercriminal activities. Botnets rely on
principled designs, where bots (infected hosts in a botnet)
execute commands on behalf of their herder (botmaster),
utilizing command and control (C&C) infrastructure [13].
Botnets today are used for a variety of cybercriminal ac-
tivities, including spam, massive denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks, and data exfiltration, among many others. Botnets
represent a major component of the cybercrime ecosystem,
with the rise of botnet-as-a-service. Today, hackers utilize
network reconnaissance to probe targets for vulnerabilities
and craft custom payloads to gain control over their infras-
tructure by spreading malware in propagation efforts.
2.2 The Need for Threat Intelligence
Defending against the threat vectors of malware and bot-
nets is a challenging task, which resulted in a rich body of
literature. The literature on defending against malware and
botnets looks into identifying “signals”, “indicators”, or sim-
ply “features” that could be useful in identifying endpoint
systems, malware, and botnets. For malware, for exam-
ple, such features could include static strings in that piece
of malware, dynamic artifacts that the malware generates
when executed in the wild, or external context information
associated with the binary binary of the malware (such as
the author’s information, operating system, etc.). For bot-
nets, the C&C infrastructure may include domain names
and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, and knowing such in-
formation can be very helpful in identifying a botnet. For ex-
ample, botnets tend to use Domain Generation Algorithms
(DGAs) [14], which result in random domain strings with
high entropy, and being able to identify those domain names
is key to detection of botnets. Furthermore, being able to
distinguish between various DGAs is key to attribution of
threat to a certain botnet family. An effective cyber defense
would rely on a good visibility into many of those features.
Combatting cyber threats and attacks requires intelligence
gathering that prelude countermeasure actions, as seen in
the above examples. To this end, cyberthreat intelligence
has become a growing concept. Today, organizations in the
public and private sector, government and industry, have
established tools seeking first-hand knowledge about new
cyber-attacks and malware threats. This includes the abil-
ity to recognize and act upon indicators of attack and com-
promise scenarios, essentially putting the pieces together for
analysis about attack methods and processes using static
and dynamic analysis and profiling techniques, open source,
social media, and dark web intelligence.
2.3 Threat Intelligence Sharing
The need for information sharing for threat intelligence
is necessitated by both economical and technical realities.
Being able to identify all the types of indicators and fea-
tures useful for characterizing, identifying, and defending
against all types of threats, while desirable, is infeasible from
both technical and economical standpoints. With new tech-
nologies such as cloud, mobile computing, social networks,
and the Internet of Things (IoTs), and the the persistence
of adversaries through cybercrime and advanced persistent
threats (APTs) have also brought several challenges. There-
fore, it is reasonable to say that no single player in this
ecosystem is capable of addressing all security issues alone.
For this reason, sharing information of threat intelligence
among vendors and government entities has emerged as a
plausible technique for efficiently and effectively defending
against new and emerging threats. With threat intelligence
sharing, operational experience is communicated to other
parties in an ecosystem to enable them to effectively defend
against current attacks, and to improve their defense posture
by preventing such attacks from happening utilizing such
actionable intelligence.
To enable information sharing, organizations need to agree
on standardizing threat information. This requires defining
the content fields, encoding, and exchange format of the
information relevant to a particular threat or incident, along
with a pre-defined protocol to communicate the criticality of
such information. Various standards for information sharing
have been proposed [3, 4, 5] to automate and structure the
exchange of threat information with a community of trust.
Today, standards are used in the exchange of indicators of
software, hardware, and network artifacts, and are intended
for operationalizing those indicators in many applications,
including security operations related to malware character-
ization, vulnerability analysis, remediation, platform hard-
ening, and incident-response [1].
2.4 Risks of Sharing
While threat information sharing brings many benefits to
the sharing community members, it may incur security risks
about participants, their operational contexts, and security
posture. Not only that, the same information, once exposed
to an adversary, may be used to test their applicability on
other target systems, who may lag behind in security up-
dates or miss out on patching vulnerabilities. Therefore,
the adversary will be able to utilize such information for
attacking other unpatched systems.
The risk of sharing may go beyond fingerprinting sys-
tems to leaking personal identifiable information about in-
dividuals. Various types of sharing standards are proven to
leak personal identifiable information (PII) that may con-
tain names, email addresses, and other types of sensitive
data [15]. For example, privacy violations in sharing stan-
dards may occur in the form of a document which contains
contact information for the constituent responsible for an
incident report. This type of information may become per-
sonally identifiable in the case when the contact information
of a particular individual are used.
Participants in a threat intelligence sharing community
may interact with one another with various degrees of col-
laboration and competition, which may affect the way they
share [8, 2]. Because of that, many companies and organi-
zations today are reluctant in sharing firsthand intelligence,
and mostly gather and ingest information from neighboring
sources that are less significant.
2.5 Formulation of the Free-Riding Problem
Given the triad of security, privacy, and risks associated
with threat intelligence sharing, some members might be
joining communities of sharing for the purpose of benefit-
ing from the platform without offering valuable information
themselves, hence, the term, “free-riding” is coined to refer
to the behavior of such users who act to maximize their own
utility at the expense of the welfare of the community.
This problem is not new, and is manifested in other dis-
tributed settings, most notably Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems.
In P2P systems, cooperation is required for the operation the
system. However, cooperation may incur significant commu-
nication and computational overhead, thus users may refuse
to contribute their fair share of resources. At the same time
they may utilize the system by consuming the resources of
other peers. Researchers demonstrated the impact of free-
riders in P2P systems, such as BitTorent [16], and observed a
significant increase in download times for high contributing
nodes in the presence of few low contributing ones.
2.6 How Quality of Indicators Help
So far, and to the best of our knowledge, understanding
the effectiveness of sharing has been viewed from the point
of view of whether participants contribute or not (thus the
literal meaning of free-riding). This form of contribution
is perceived as a volume-based contribution, since the level
of contribution by any participant is evaluated directly by
the amount of information communicated to the community
regardless of its nature, whether it is used by community
members or not. Given the large amount of unprocessed
threat-related events, which are generated by automation
tools, such as security information and event management
(SIEM) technologies, and the fact that in many sharing sys-
tems today, the contribution level amounts to the volume of
data, actors may find it more convenient to submit raw, un-
processed, or unused events as indicators of threat to avoid
the investment on resources for cleaning, contextualizing,
operationalizing, and filtering such information. For this
reason, it is important to consider the quality of shared in-
formation as the basis for evaluating the level of participa-
tion, because a simple and coarse measure of participation is
insufficient. In order to overcome these obstacles, in this pa-
per we propose QoI as a quantifiable and measurable metrics
and provide a methods for quality assessment.
3. QOI ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Assessing QoI is a nontrivial task. However, as other qual-
ity notions (e.g., quality of services, quality of experience,
etc.), QoI requires defining metrics, methodology for assess-
ing such metrics, and methods for validation of the proposed
metrics based on sound assumptions, to find out what capa-
bilities they provide, including addressing free-riding.
Our approach in developing QoI metrics is intuitive, and
uses several sounds assumptions driven from the context in
which indicators are used. In particular, QoI metrics include
correctness of an indicator with respect to a label feature,
the relevance of the indicator to a consuming community
member, the utility of the indicator, and its uniqueness.
More (informal) details are provided in section 3.1.
Our approach for assessment of QoI uses a reference“golden”
dataset as ground truth. Based on whether the indicator
provided by a community member is in the reference dataset
or not, the assessor proceeds by either matching the metric
attribute of the indicator to that of the golden dataset. If
the indicator is not in the golden set, and assuming that
the golden dataset has “similar indicators”, a machine learn-
ing algorithm is used for predicting the attribute of the QoI
metric, and compare it to the one provided by community
member. For an arbitrary number of indicators provided by
the community member, a score is then established for that
community member based on the normalized weighted sum
of QoI values across all indicators.
In this section, we describe the quality metrics and the
details of our methodology including a system architecture
for assessment, processes followed and the data-flow.
3.1 QoI Metrics
In the following, we identified four metrics to be used for
assessment of quality: correctness, relevance, utility, and
uniqueness, as described below.
3.1.1 Correctness
For a given reference dataset, the correctness metric of QoI
captures whether attributes of an indicator (e.g., label used
for attribution, severity score used for risk assessment, etc.)
are consistent with the assessor’s reference. For that, and
using the labeling of a malware sample as an example of an
attribute for an indicator, we compute the correctness score
as the fraction of samples that match the anticipated labels.
Specifically, this is computed as the aggregate binary score
of the correct samples normalized by the size of the sample
set of indicators.
3.1.2 Relevance
Informally, the relevance metric of a QoI measures the ex-
tent to which an indicator submitted by a community mem-
ber to the community is contextual and of interest to the
rest of the community. As such, in defining and assessing
the relevance of an indicator, we use a reference weight as-
signment to the class labels giving higher weight to labels of
greater interest to a particularly community member (asses-
sor) and lower weights to less desirable labels. The relevance
score is then computed as the average weighted sum for all
sample indicators in the set.
3.1.3 Utility
The utility is similar to the relevance of an indicator, al-
though at a finer-granularity than an indicator. As such, we
view the utility of an indicator as the average weighted sum
of all of its feature components. This is, we assign a different
weight to each feature of the indicator to leverage features
that are a better candidate input to prediction of threats.
While the weighting of the features of an indicator could be
realized using one of many ways, we suggest the information
gain as a measure of weighting features. For example, us-
ing a similar notion, the weights of the feature components
can be computed using various statistical models for sensi-
tivity analysis, including the Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) technique [17]).
3.1.4 Uniqueness
The uniqueness of an indicator is a measure of the (dis)-
similarity of the indicator in comparison with other submit-
ted indicators by contributors in the community. A vector
distance (e.g., using the Mahalanobis distance [18], which
captures the difference between a point ~x and a distribution
of points X = { ~x1, ~x2, . . . , ~xn} with a mean ~µ) is computed
to determine the degree of uniqueness. We also define a
threshold on the minimum distance between the feature vec-
tor of an indicator to other indicators, and use that threshold
to tell whether an indicator is unique or not.
3.2 System Architecture & Design
Having elaborated on the informal definition of QoI met-
rics, we now move to discuss the QoI system architecture,
first as a strawman highlighting the main concept of assess-
ing QoI, and then as a fully functioning system that ad-
dresses various issues in the strawman design.
Our system for assessing QoI operates for a set of dis-
tributed nodes in a community of trust. Those nodes are
are logically connected with each other in a P2P fashion, as
shown in Figure 1. As such, each of these nodes would par-
ticipate in the sharing and consumption of threat indicators
provided by other peers, which is achieved within a com-
munity of trust that is separated from other communities
in the sharing ecosystem. Before nodes can accept and op-
erationalize (process) these threat indicators, they need to
evaluate their quality by asking a special node, an assessor,
which has sufficient information to perform such function,
for a rating (scoring) of the indicator. In response, the as-
sessor assigns a quality score for the indicator based on a
ground-truth available to the assessor, and using a reference
dataset the assessor has access to.
Disseminate
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QoI(x2) Match*&
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Figure 1: A strawman design for an architecture to
assess QoI using a centralized assessor.
In this architecture, we assume that the messages sent
between the peers in the system are authentic and tamper-
evident, using existing threat exchange protocols that pro-
vide end-to-end security guarantees. One issue that the
above architecture may suffer from is the amount of trust
each community member has to put in the assessor, and the
validity of his scoring of indicators. We address this issue by
assuming that the architecture can support more than one
assessor node, and these nodes may coordinate among each
each other. We leave exploring the spectrum of the number
of assessors and the rationale for various numbers as a fea-
ture work. However, as a feature, a consumer of a score by
the assessors (where the assessors’ number is greater than
2) could perform a majority voting to improve the robust-
ness of the scoring to address intentional bias (dishonesty of
assessors, if any), and unintentional bias (due to issues with
the underlying ground truth dataset). On the other hand,
any and every node in the system could act as an assessor,
if the golden reference dataset is available to them.
While the latter assumption of the availability of the data
to each node in the system is very implausible, a milder as-
sumption for the operation of the strawman design above
is the coverage of data: the system assumes the reference
dataset has sufficient information about every possible indi-
cators presented by the various community members. How-
ever, based on a prior work assessing coverage of indica-
tors [19], no single community member (antivirus scanner)
in the case of malware detection and labeling has a 100%
coverage or accuracy. Based on the same study, and for a
malware family such as Zeus [20], it takes 6 and 18 commu-
nity members to provide close to perfect coverage of detec-
tion and correctness of labeling, respectively. Such numbers
are close to 10% and 30%, respectively, of the entire set of
community members with antivirus scans in the VirusTo-
tal dataset. This in particular calls for a more “intelligent”
process for the assessment of QoI, using not only explicitly
provided labels, but also using learned labels from features
of indicators utilizing advanced machine learning techniques.
3.3 System Setup and Steps
At a high-level, our ideal system for assessment has the
following specific procedures for system setup:
1. Defining quality metrics and scoring procedures. Qual-
ity metrics are used as a measurement criteria to en-
sure that community members who participate in in-
formation sharing provide threat indicators that are
valuable to other members, while scoring procedures
are methods that specify how these metrics are used
to generate a quality score.
2. Defining annotations for threat and quality labeling.
Annotations can either be labels that indicate the type
of threat or they can be labels for identifying the qual-
ity (severity, timeliness, etc.) level or quality type of an
indicator. Utilizing these annotations, a weight value
is assigned to each quality label, and a scoring method
is utilized to convert the quality labels to a numeric
aggregate score for the indicator.
3. Building the reference dataset. The reference dataset
will be used to evaluate QoI for a sample of indicators
submitted by a sample provider. To build the initial
reference dataset, data that is collected through secu-
rity operations (e.g., monitoring, profiling, analyses,
etc.) is vetted for their validity and applicability to
the domain, perhaps using often expensive by neces-
sary manual vetting [19, 21].
4. Defining extrapolation procedures and training the clas-
sifier. Extrapolation procedures enable a quality asses-
sor to predict the label of an indicator using its feature
set and classifier model. The classifier is trained using
a supervised learning process extracted from the ref-
erence dataset. This reference dataset is collected for
the purpose of initializing the system.
After the initial setup of the system, the sample indicator
is assessed for its quality and a quality score is computed.
The following describes the steps of the assessment. 1) Ob-
tain a set of sample indicators where each sample is com-
posed of a tuple (label, vector) that consists of a label and
a vector of features. 2) For each sample, extract the feature
vector and feed the data as test input to the trained classifier
which predicts its label. 3) Compare between the predicted
label and the label provided by the sample. Indicate whether
the two labels match, and record the comparison result as
a quality annotation. 4) Compute the confidence level and
include other quality annotations for the indicator using the
labeling rubric. 5) Use scoring procedures and quality labels
to compute a quality score for the indicator.
3.4 QoI Assessment Process Operation
The illustration for the complete process and dataflow of
the QoI assessment method embraced in our design is de-
picted in Figure 2. As can be seen in the figure, the setup
of the system is achieved through the use of a supervised
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Figure 2: The QoI assessment process, incorporat-
ing a reference model established using the training
procedure of a machine learning algorithm and pre-
dicted label of an indicator provided by a commu-
nity member. For correctness of indicators as the
target metric, a high quality is achieved when the
predicted label matches the label provided by the
community member (sample IoC label).
learning process over the reference dataset, rather than the
direct matching of explicit labels of indicators in the dataset.
In this assessment system, we assume a reference labeled
(training) dataset that contains a comprehensive library of
artifacts, such as malware samples, incident reports, and
logs, and that has been collected through typical operational
intelligence gathering procedures. Ways for obtaining such
labels falls out of the scope of this work, and industry’s best
practices, as described in [19] could be used. Upon ingest-
ing those artifacts in our system, they are converted into
a set of training samples with their corresponding features.
Each sample is a pair that consists of a feature vector as an
input object for the machine learning algorithm and the cor-
responding threat label as the desired output value for the
object class. To reach such end goal of predicting a label
correctly, the build of our trained model encompass multi-
ple components, namely a feature selection procedure, a ma-
chine learning algorithm selection procedure (e.g., SVM, lo-
gistic regression, random forest, etc.) and the corresponding
parameters (e.g., procedure for regularization and lineariza-
tion in case of SVM and LR, respectively), and cross valida-
tion procedures (e.g., fold size, validation strategy, etc.).
Upon building the machine learning model, establishing
a confidence in its performance through typical evaluation
metrics (e.g., low false positive and false negative, and high
true positive and true negative), we then use the built model
as a predictor for previously unseen threat indicators. In
such operational setting, given a sample indicator provided
by a community member, and before ingesting it the com-
munity member would pass it to the assessor for further
evaluation and scoring. The assessor then extracts a feature
set corresponding to the indicator using a standard form,
and converts it into a feature vector. The assessor then uses
the previously built model as a predictor, and assigns a label
(e.g., using a multiclass SVM, the assessor can indicate the
label closest in the training set to that of the newly observed
indicator). The assessor then decides the quality of the in-
dicator by taking both the predicted and the self-provided
label by the community member into account. The quality
scoring engine then uses the individual scores of the various
indicators provided by each community member to assess
their actual contribution, and detect free-riders.
We note that the“intelligent”system above addresses vari-
ous issues in the strawman system. First, rather than requir-
ing the actual indicators to be present in the ground-truth
dataset, this technique requires only the availability of a suf-
ficient number of indicators of the same label. Second, with
such flexibility in defining the ground-truth through a learn-
ing and model-building process, the number of community
members that can act as assessors greatly increase. Finally,
the even when the labels of indicators are not provided by
the community member, e.g., artifacts provided to the com-
munity are not operationalized, this technique makes use of
those indicators through other measures of QoI, such as rele-
vance, or utility, or uniqueness, which do not require a label
to be provided by the contributing community member.
4. QOI ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES
As discussed in section 3.3, the QoI assessment process is
composed of a series of steps in order to initialize and oper-
ate our system for both assessment of individual indicators
and scoring of community members as a whole. Specifically,
these steps begin with collecting the reference dataset and
building the prediction model, then extrapolating, bench-
marking, and computing a quality score for a given indica-
tor. In the following, we outline in more details each of those
processes and procedures.
4.1 Reference Dataset and Learning
After identifying metrics for defining quality, as exempli-
fied in section 3.1, we demonstrated the use of QoI for the
assessment of the contribution level of participants. As men-
tioned before, our methods for computing the QoI involve
multiple processes. In order to initialize the system the ref-
erence dataset is used to build prediction model through
supervised techniques of machine learning.
Specifically, this involves submission of sample artifacts
from multiple sources, and the premise is to utilize the no-
tion of quality as opposed to a simple view of contribution
based on the volume of data (i.e. the number of samples). In
order to evaluate the QoI provided by community members,
a reference dataset is used as a resource of ground truth.
While proposing methods for obtaining ground truth falls
out of the scope of this work, we only use an example in
this work to bootstrap the evaluation. In particular, in this
work we demonstrate evaluating the quality of malware la-
bels by AV vendor using VirusTotal as a reference dataset
with samples that are manually vetted by one community
member [19] (in such setting VirusTotal could be loosely de-
fined as the community of trust). In short, VirusTotal is a
multi-engine AV scanner that accepts submissions by users
and scans the samples with those engines. The results from
VirusTotal provide many useful artifacts and annotations,
including the labeling of a sample by the various engines of
AV scanners, as well as other behavioral and static features
of malware samples. Though there might be some inconsis-
tencies in the final labeling between the results of VirusTo-
tal and across vendors, the premise is that the tool can be
trusted for samples that have been submitted multiple times
over sufficient periods of time, particularly since AV vendors
update their results with VirusTotal whenever acquiring a
new signature for a previously unknown sample.
Features provided in the ground truth are particularly
useful in a learning a model for their label prediction. To
identify the family to which a malware sample belongs, se-
curity vendors (AV scanners, community members) usually
gather various characteristics and features of the sample us-
ing static analysis, dynamic analysis, and memory foren-
sics. For static analysis, artifacts like file name, size, hashes,
magic literals, compression artifacts, date, source, author,
file type and portal executable (PE) header, sections, im-
ports, import hash, among others, are used. For dynamic
analysis, file system, user memory, registry, and network
artifacts and features are collected. For memory forensics,
memory byte patterns are captured to create a signature.
4.2 Extrapolation and Benchmarking
After building the prediction function by training classi-
fier with the reference dataset, the next step is to assess QoI
through extrapolation from the prediction function results.
The remaining question becomes how the reference set are
used to assess and extrapolate the values and quality of in-
dicators. In order to answer this question, we elaborate on a
particular machine learning techniques, the semi-supervised
learning and its application to the problem at hand.
Classifier model. While our system described in the pre-
vious section uses multiple off-the-shelf algorithms, we high-
light the operation of QoI using a classifier model based on
the nearest centroid classifier (ncc), specifically we adopt a
variant called the linear discriminant analysis [22] to map
threat indicators to their respective labels. In this model,
each label is characterized by its vector of average feature
values (i.e. class centroid). A new sample indicator is evalu-
ated by computing the scaled distance between the features
of the sample and each class centroid, and then the sample
is assigned to the class to which it is nearest.
To build the classifier, we obtain r samples for training
from the reference dataset. This dataset is built such that
there are ri training samples per class, with d features per
sample. For each training sample y, we observe a label ` ∈ Λ
and a sample vector ~y. For simplicity we refer to the classes
labels by their indices i = 1, 2, . . . , λ. Note that each ~y is
a vector of length m. We assume that samples labeled by i
are distributed as N (µi,Σ), the multivariate normal distri-
bution with mean vector µi and standard deviation matrix
Σ. We denote by L(x, µi,Σ), the corresponding probability
density function. Finally, let pii be the prior probability that
an unknown sample comes from class labeled by i.
Bayes’ Theorem states that the probability that an ob-
served sample x comes from class i is proportional to the
product of the class density and prior probability:
P (Z = i|X = x) ∝ L(x, µi,Σ)× pii (1)
where P (Z = i|X = x) is the posterior probability that sam-
ple x comes from class i. The classifier assigns the sample to
the class with the largest posterior probability to minimize
the misclassification error. This can be written as a rule:
zˆ(x) = arg min
i
{(x− µi)TΣ−1(x− µi)− 2 log(pii)}. (2)
Therefore, a sample is assigned to the nearest class and the
distance is computed using the LDA metric: ||x − µi||2Σ −
2 log(pii), where ||x−µ||2 = (x−µ)TΣ−1(x−µ) is the square
of the Mahalanobis distance between x and µ.
Misclassification rate. A misclassfication occurs when an
indicator is assigned to an incorrect label. The probability
of making a classification error P () is:
P () =
λ∑
j=1
[P (Zˆ 6= j|Z = j)× pij ]. (3)
The misclassification rate using the LDA rule can be derived
from (2). In particular, we can calculate the misclassification
rate of the nearest-centroid using:
P () =
λ∑
j=1
[1−φ(min
i 6=j
{‖µj − µi‖2Σ + 2 log(pijpii )
2‖µj − µi‖Σ
}
)]×pij , (4)
where φ is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the
standard normal distribution. Note that this assumes that
the sample data are normally distributed as stated by the
model. The equation above can be interpreted as a mea-
sure of the collective distance between all of the class cen-
troids taking into account class prior probabilities. In gen-
eral, the misclassification rate is small when the centroids
are far apart and increases otherwise.
4.3 Labeling and Quality Scoring
We used the ncc to predict labels for observed indicators
and compared the results with the sample labels. This en-
ables us to compute a score on the correctness and quality
of the feature set for the indicators. In the following we for-
malize the steps to compute a score for the samples based
on the quality metrics described earlier.
Denote by n the number of users in the system. Each user
ui provides a set of samplesXi = {(~xi1, li1), (~xi2, li2), (~xi3, li3),
. . . , (~xik, lik)} with feature vector ~xij and sample label lij ∈
Λ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
4.3.1 Correctness
As described earlier, the reference dataset is used as the
benchmark for determining the correct label for an arbitrary
sample. Each sample consists of a feature vector and an
associated label. In procedure 1 we outline the algorithm
used for computing the correctness as a QoI metric.
As shown above, we first build a classifier by utilizing
the reference dataset Y as the training set and forming a
prediction on the label of ~x to obtain l′. Then, the assigned
label of ~x is compared against the predicted label l′ and a
positive score is given if labels match. The correctness is
computed as the average sum of scores for all samples in Xi.
4.3.2 Relevance
The steps for computing the relevance variable of a set
of indicators are shown in Scoring Procedure 2. As can
be seen, the weight values ωr1 , ωr2 , . . . ωr|Λ| are arbitrarily
chosen, and a mapping function wR(.) is defined to assign
weights labels such that higher weight values are assigned
to labels of greater interest to the community members.
For each sample x, the corresponding label is evaluated
using the mapping function wR(.) to obtain the weight value
as the sample score. The relevance score of Xi, denoted by
R(Xi), is calculated as the average weight sum of the scores.
Scoring Procedure 1 Correctness of Xi (C)
1: Obtain reference dataset Y = {(~y1, l1), (~y2, l2), (~y3, l3),
. . . , (~yr, lr)} where li ∈ Λ for i = 1, 2, . . . , r.
2: Evaluate Xi by applying the ncc method as follows:
a Training : Compute reference indicators
~µ1, ~µ2, . . . , ~µ|Λ| for class labels in Λ, as per-
class centroids ~µ` = 1/|Yt|
∑
(~yi,li)∈Y` ~yi, where Y`
is a subset of Y belonging to the class label ` ∈ Λ.
b Prediction: For every sample ~xij , apply the classi-
fier function to compute the label,
l′ = arg min
l∈Λ
||~µl − ~x||
3: For every sample, compute the sample score sc(~xij) as:
sc(~xij) =
{
1 l′j = lij
0 otherwise
4: Compute the correctness score (C) of Xi by taking the
average sum: C(Xi) =
1
k
∑k
j=1 s(~xij)
Scoring Procedure 2 Relevance of Xi (R)
1: Define weight values: ωr1 , ωr2 , ωr3 , . . . , ωr|Λ| ∈ R
2: Define a weight function wR(.) to assign elements in the
label set li ∈ Λ as wR(li) = ωri
3: Compute the relevance of Xi as average weighted sum:
R(Xi) = (
∑
(~xij ,lij)∈Xi
wR(lij))/(
|Λ|∑
k=1
ωrk )
4.3.3 Utility
Next, we provide the sequence of steps required for cal-
culating the utility variable of a set of indicators, in pro-
cedure 3. In this procedure we note that the utility of an
indicator is determined by the sum of the utility weights of
the samples. The weights ωt1 , ωt2 . . . ωtd and weight func-
tion wT (.) are defined by the application.
4.3.4 Uniqueness
Another metric of QoI is their uniqueness, where highly
unique indicators are considered more valuable than com-
mon indicators. In procedure 4 we outline the steps used for
calculating the uniqueness of a set of indicators.
In this procedure, we assume that samples can be uniquely
identified (e.g. using hashes). In set notation, we can say
that an element xij ∈ Xi is unique if it is not an element of
other sample sets, i.e. xij /∈ ⋃X\ {Xi}.
4.3.5 Quality of Indicator (QoI)
QoI is a comprehensive measure of the various notions
of quality defined earlier. In particular, QoI for Xi is the
average weighted sum of the four components: correctness
(C), relevance (R), utility (U) and uniqueness (N), as shown
in procedure 5. The weights assigned for individual metrics
are application- and community member-specific.
5. EVALUATION AND FINDINGS
In this section, we evaluate the scoring method for contri-
Scoring Procedure 3 Utility of Xi (U)
1: Define utility types t1, t2, . . . , td ∈ R
2: Define weight values ωt1 , ωt2 . . . ωtd , where each weight
value corresponds to a utility type.
3: Define a weight function wT (.) s.t. ` ∈ Λ maps to a
utility weight, i.e. wT (`) = ωtm where m = {1, 2, . . . , d}.
4: for x ∈ Xi do
5: Compute a weight of x = (~x, l′), using wT (l′) = ωtl′
6: end for
7: Compute the utility score of Xi as the average sum of
the sample weights: U(Xi) =
1
k
∑k
j=1 ωtj , where tj is
the corresponding label type of sample xij ∈ Xi
Scoring Procedure 4 Uniqueness of Xi (N)
1: Consider the set Z which is initially empty, i.e. Z = φ
2: Build the set Z by considering unique samples from the
sets X1, X2, ...Xn
3: for i = 1, 2, . . . n do
4: for j = 1, 2, . . . k do
5: if xij /∈ Z then add xij to Z.
6: end if
7: end for
8: end for
9: Compute the uniqueness score for Xi as follows
sn(xij) =
{
1 xij ∈ Z\ {Xi}
0 otherwise
(5)
10: Compute the uniqueness score (N) of Xi by accumulat-
ing the scores of the elements: N(Xi) =
1
k
∑k
j=1 sn(xij)
bution based on quality of indicators, and highlight how it
addresses the free-riding problem in information sharing in
a unique way. We start by analyzing the dataset that we ob-
tained from AV vendors about their sample labeling, then we
utilize this dataset and apply QoI-based and volume-based
scoring methods to compare between the vendors.
5.1 Dataset Characteristics
To highlight QoI as a new notion of evaluating contribu-
tion in information sharing for threat intelligence, we com-
pare the difference between quality-based and volume-based
scoring methods for the contribution of AV vendors. To
this end, our dataset enumerates AV vendors who submit-
ted their artifacts of malware samples, including labels, to
VirusTotal during the period of our data collection from
mid 2011 to mid 2013 [19]. A key goal of the evaluation
is to demonstrate the deficiency in the use of volume-based
scores, since one vendor can achieve a high rating by submit-
ting a large number of artifacts about malware samples of
low quality. As discussed previously, this could happen be-
cause of several reasons: the submitted artifacts about some
malware sample are incorrect, the sample family is uninter-
esting, or that the kind of information submitted about the
samples are not helpful in identifying or detecting them.
Table 1 depicts the malware families used in this study,
their sample size, and the corresponding brief description of
each family type. All scans are carried out on those malware
samples around May 2013 timeframe. The dataset provides
a diverse representation of families, which nicely facilitate
Scoring Procedure 5 QoI of Xi (QoI)
1: Define normalized weights for the components:
ωC , ωR, ωU , and ωN .
2: Calculate the quality of indicator (QoI) as the weighted
sum of the components: QoI(Xi) = ωCC(Xi) +
ωRR(Xi) + ωUU(Xi) + ωNN(Xi)
Table 1: Malware families used in the study. DDoS
stands for distributed denial of service. Also, Ddoser
is known as BlackEnergy while Darkness is known
as Optima. Dataset and description are from [19].
Malware family # Description
Avzhan 3458 Commercial DDoS bot
Darkness 1878 Commercial DDoS bot
Ddoser 502 Commercial DDoS bot
jkddos 333 Comercial DDoS bot
N0ise 431 Commerical DDoS bot
ShadyRAT 1287 targeted gov and corps
DNSCalc 403 targeted US defense companies
Lurid 399 initially targeted NGOs
Getkys 953 targets medical sector
ZeroAccess 568 Rootkit, monetized by click-fraud
Zeus 1975 Banking, targets credentials
our study. As can be seen, Avzhan and Darkness are the
most popular DDoS malware being submitted. On the other
hand, ShadyRAT is the most popular targeted malware with
the largest sample size in its category (represents about 43%
of the targeted samples and 24% of the total samples), while
Zeus has the largest sample size for Trojan malware, roughly
about 77% of the Trojan samples and 16% of the total sam-
ples. Furthermore, we observe that more than half of the
samples are DDoS (54%), 21% are Trojans, and 25% are
targeted malware.This breakdown provides an insight about
the threat landscape and the frequency in which these types
of malware appear in the wild. Oftentimes AV vendors har-
vest malware samples by utilizing deployment of Internet
sensors for packet capturing, or using isolated environments
such as honeypots and virtualization tools for behavioral
analysis. The increased number of samples for DDoS is jus-
tified by the need for vast deployment for scaling up the
number of infected hosts to launching attacks. On the other
hand, targeted malware are less common in the wild because
they are deployed in limited number of hosts, and are typ-
ically designed with covertness in mind. In the rest of this
analysis, the identity of the vendors is anonymized.
5.2 Results
In this section, we introduce the results and finding by
performing an evaluation of the various QoI metrics over
our evaluation dataset (we evaluate all but uniqueness, since
it is trivial to assess). First, we note that while there are
more samples gathered for DDoS-type malware in compar-
ison with others, the threat-intelligence community often
gives more weight to identify malware or incidents that are
less observable, which present a level of sophistication. Thus,
for our evaluation, we consider trojan and targeted malware
more relevant than DDoS, from the point of view of com-
munity members consuming the shared information.
Relevance. Figure 3 presents the normalized scores for the
relevance of indicators for each vendor. In assessing rele-
vance, we give more weight to targeted malware and Trojans
over DDoS samples of each vendor (community member).
Specifically, the weights are ωtargeted = 5, ωtroj = 3, and
ωddos = 1m and “0” otherwise. As shown, in the relevance-
based assessment a higher score is given to vendors who con-
tribute more targeted and Trojan samples, and vendors who
only contribute DDoS samples are greatly de-emphasized.
We observe two distinct behaviors. First certain contribu-
tors who have high volume-based score tend to have a very
low (close to “0”) score when using the QoI metric of rele-
vance for their evaluation. In particular, with the two rele-
vant and one less relevant family types of interest identified,
such community members tend have more unidentified (ir-
relevant; i.e., individual score of “0”) malware samples and
families (e.g., vendor 7, vendor 21, vendor 59, etc.). On
the other hand, certain contributors (although smaller in
numbers), and despite having a small volume-based contri-
bution, tend to have higher relevance score, thanks to having
the very relevant family identified in their shared indicator
labels (e.g., vendor 10 , vendor 16, vendor 27, etc.).
Correctness. An assessment of the correctness of the AV
indicators is depicted in Figure 4. As can be seen, vendor
4, vendor 27, and vendor 30, outperformed other vendors
in this metric with a score in the 80s up to top 90s per-
centile range, highlighting a quality of the labels provided
by those vendors corresponding to the actually learned la-
bels of the samples provided by them. On the other hand,
the majority of the rest of vendors tend to have a gap in
the score between the volume-based and the correctness-
based contribution measures, where the correctness-based
measure is significantly lower. There are various reasons
for why some vendors tend to score low for correctness de-
spite their large (volume-based) contribution. This could
be caused by them labeling samples under unknown names,
mislabeling to other family types due to similarities between
families, or assigning generic labels like “trojan”, “virus”,
“unclassified” among other misleading labels. Examining
the correctness of AV indicators also leads to a more subtle
discussion about their utility. Looking closer into the label
generated by some vendors, we find out that some labels are
too generic in the sense that they only describe the behav-
ior rather than name of a known malware family type, e.g.,
Trojan.Win32.ServStart vs. Avzhan.
Utility. To evaluate the utility of AV indicators, we give
weights for three classes of malware labels: complete labels
(ωc) are based on industrially popular name, generic labels
(ωg) are based on placeholders commonly used for label-
ing the family such as “generic”, “worm”, “trojan”, “start”
and “run”, and incomplete labels, (ωi), including “suspi-
cious”, “malware”, and “unclassified”, which do not hold
any meaning of a class. Similar to the strategy with rele-
vance, we assign weights of ωc = 5, ωg = 2, and ωi = 1.
We plot the results of evaluating the utility of indicators in
Figure 5. We notice that vendors such as vendor 51, ven-
dor 53, and vendor 59 are rated as high utility indicator
providers that surpass their volume-based scores. Neverthe-
less, these vendors’ high utility indicator is offset in Figure 6
that includes two more metrics: correctness and relevance.
These additional metrics show that these vendors achieve
insignificant correctness and relevance. Figure 6 captures
the importance of displaying the three scores in a single plot
to allow direct comparison of the various quality-based met-
rics. We notice that there is a clear correlation between the
correctness and relevance scores. This is because we only
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Figure 3: Comparison between relevance-based and volume-based scoring
compute relevance scores for correctly submitted samples,
where incorrect labels are zeroed in the relevance score.
Aggregated QoI score. As described earlier, we aggregate
a single QoI score for each vendor based on the weighted
sum of the various QoI metrics. In Figure 7, we present a
comparative bar-plot between QoI-based and volume-based
scoring for assessment of contribution by the AV vendors. As
can be seen, many vendors, such as vendor 14, vendor 57,
and vendor 58 which received high QoI scores are rated with
lower scores in their volume-based rating. In particular, they
received from 15-75 percent lower rating in their volume-
based scores. On the other hand, vendors like vendor 11
and vendor 18, and vendor 20, which tended to provide a
very high volume-based indicators, have very small (close
to zero) QoI score, highlighting their potential as free-riding
candidates.
6. RELATEDWORK
The free-riding problem in threat intelligence sharing is
not addressed before, nor measures of quality broadly de-
fined, or closely identified for assessing contribution by com-
munity members. However, the problem of free-riding in
general is not new and has been a topic of discussion in the
peer-to-peer (P2P) systems community.
Going early back in the literature, Adar and Huberman [23]
were first to spot the problem in P2P systems as they no-
ticed the existence of a large fraction of users who do not
share useful content in the file sharing network Gnutella. A
few years later, Feldman et al. [24] characterized the prob-
lem of free-riding in peer-to-peer systems and proposed po-
tential directions for research. In response, a stream of pa-
pers were published on the topic, most notably, the work
of Locher et al. [16], who developed a free-riding client as
a proof-of-concept and demonstrated how entire files can
be downloaded in the BitTorrent network without providing
any content to the peers. While Locher et al. have con-
centrated on analyzing the feasibility of free-riding attacks,
other papers [25, 26] are more focused on analyzing their
root-cause and impact on the overall system utility.
In light of operationalizing the functions of threat in-
telligence, various information sharing standards were pro-
posed including those developed by IETF (https://www.ietf.
org/), MITRE (https://www.mitre.org/), and NIST (https:
//www.nist.gov/). Industry leaders have picked up on these
standards and developed application program interfaces (APIs)
to facilitate delivery and retrieval of raw, processed, and
structure and intelligence data, such as ThreatExchange [27]
by Facebook and IntelGraph by Verisign. However, sharing
standards have shown to exhibit privacy violations includ-
ing leaking PII fields, as demonstrated by [1], potentially
encouraging the act of free-riding.
Of relevance to the notion of quality of indicators in threat
intelligent systems is malware attribution. Malware attribu-
tion have been widely employed in the literature for train-
ing algorithms and techniques of malware classification and
labeling [28], and understanding the utility of attributes as
detector patterns of malware samples has been an important
subject matter. Bailey et al. [29] were one of the early folks
to characterize malware in terms of system state changes
(e.g. registry changes, files created) and investigated the
problem of behavior-based clustering as a method for clas-
sifying and analyzing Internet malware.
More focused on the labeling problem, Canto et al. [30] an-
alyzed the quality of labeling of malware samples for a couple
of vendors and pointed out their labeling inconsistencies. In
the same vein, Perdisci [31] analyzed the shortcomings of
malware labeling of various AV vendors by constructing a
graph from the labels and measuring the distance between
them. On the other hand, Mohaisen and Alrawi [19, 32]
quantified the inconsistencies in labeling against a reference
dataset collected from thousands of samples of various types
which were manually vetted by analysts. In their study, the
authors evaluated the detection rate, correctness, and con-
sistency of labeling of AV scanners.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have the first look at the notion of the
quality of indicators (QoI) for understanding the contribu-
tion of community members in information sharing paradigms.
Unlike other peer-to-peer systems in which the volume of
contribution (bandwidth, size of files, etc.) is a good indi-
cator of contribution, we argue that the special nature of
security applications calls for more elaborate notion of con-
tribution. As such, we define multiple metrics for assessing
contribution, including correctness, utility, and relevance of
indicators. As compared to volume-based measures for con-
tribution, and thus free-riding, our metrics are more robust,
contextual, and reasonably quantify the actual contribution
of individuals. By verifying our metrics on a real-world data
of antivirus scans we unveil that contribution measured by
volume is not always consistent with those quality measures,
and that QoI as notion is capable of capturing forms of con-
tribution beyond free-riding.
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Figure 4: Comparison between correctness-based and volume-based scoring of AV indicators
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Figure 5: Comparison between utility-based and volume-based scoring
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Figure 7: Comparison between QoI-based and volume-based scoring
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